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1 Introduction 
Indispensability arguments used to be the only game in town for philosophers 
of mathematics. One had to be realist about mathematics if one was a sci-
entific realist. After all. mathematics is indispensable to formulating OUf best 
scientific theories. And it would he 'intellectually dishonest' to be realist about 
the physical components of scientific theory while remaining agnostic or anti-
realist about the mathematical aspects of those theories. 
Soon enough, however, the rot set in. Good philosophers began to have 
doubts about indispensability arguments. Parsons (1986) pointed out that the 
inferences to the best explanation mentioned in indispensability arguments 
didn't explain the 'obviousness' of elementary mathematical truths such as 
'2+2=4 '. Furthermore, indispensability arguments leave unapplied pure math-
ematics in the twilight zone. In response, Quine dismissed such pure mathe-
matics as 'recreational mathematics', surely a desperate move given that at any 
time a great deal of mathematics is unapplied. 1 
Then a strange thing happened. Even theorists in favour of the indispens-
ability argument began to step back from embracing it wholeheartedly. Pene-
lope Maddy Jed the way with her reminder that pure mathematics-such as set 
theory and analysis- is an autonomous discipline with its own distinctive epis-
temie practices and norms quite different from those employed in empirical 
I For the dphate over the significance of recreational mathematics, see J,eng (2002) and the reply 
by Colyvan (2007). 
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sciences. ]n pure mathematics. mathematicians come to accept statements as 
true almost solely on the basis of proof from accepted axioms. It is surely an 
embarrassment for Quinean empiricism that it seems to get the epistemology 
of mathematics wrong. hs epiMernological holism implied th~t mathematics 
should he tested and confirmed like the rest of empirical science. However, 
when an empirical theory fails to be confirmed, we don't take this failure as 
evidence that the mathematics used to articulate the theory is false. Rather, 
we don't evpn assume that the mathematics is being tested at al1.2 
It is bad enough that Quine's indispensability argument appears to distort 
the epistemology of mathematics. What is more scandalous is that philoso-
phers cannot agree on the metaphysical conclusion of the argument. Sure, ev-
eryone agrees that indispensahility is an argument for realism, but beyond this 
point the agreement ends. Quine's indispensability argument tells us nothing 
specifk ahout the metaphysical nature of mathematical entities. It oocs not 
tell us what the basic mathematical entities are, or in what way they exist It 
docs not settle the ancient dispute between Platonists and Aristotelians over 
whether mathematical objects are abstract Of concrete, particular Of univer-
sal. The indispensability argument simply tells us that we ought to believe in 
the existence of whatever it is that mathematicians are talking about, because 
we are oflt%gicnllycommitteli to them by ollr best scientifit: theories. 
Despite brief protests to the contrary,:1 most scientific realists still assume 
t.hat Ihc conclusion of Quine's indispensability argument will involve some 
commitment to abstract entities.4 In this assumption, realists are no doubt 
influenced by Quine's reluctant Platonism ahout classes at the end of Word 
and Object (\900: 2:l:l-70). Quine hecomes a reluctant Platonist because he 
knows of no alternative way of construing classes and numbers other than as 
abstract, otlwr-worlllly entities. Deeper reflection on his indispensability ar· 
gurnent shows that it is metaphysically shallow: the fact that slIch-and-sllch 
mathemCltics is useful in doing science tells us vcry little about the content 
of the metaphysi<:s of science or mathematics. In fact, indispensability argu· 
mcnts are structurally as well as metaphysically neutral as regards the variety 
of realism we adopt: thcy don't tell us whether mathematical objeUs are ab-
stract Of concrete, lone atoms or structured complexes. (Similarly, arguments 
for the reality of atoms do not te1ius whether they are hard particles or proba-
bility douds.) Rather, indispensability arguments simply tell us that we ought 
to b~lieye in the exi~tence of mathematical objects, because we are ontologi-
cally committed to them hy our best scientific theories. 
2The pnilll is mHcle at It'ngth in Sober (1993). 
30n attempts to IlHlke way for tt lion-Platonist variety of realism. see Cheyne and Pidgen (l996). 
The possibility is JIlellfifllwd ill passing in Colyvan{2001: 142). 
41n his papp.r in Ihis volume, Stathis Psillos argHt's that the indispensability argument dues lead 
one to conclude that there are 'mixed facts', consisting of an <lbstract, mathematical component 
and connete, ph~iskat component. On thp Platonist realism that T~sl]lts, there net~d be no causal 
interaction bctwt'f!n tilt' abstract and physictl\ components of sllch 'll1ixf'd racts'. 
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The search is 00\'\' on to salvage what is left of indispensability arguments. 
The insight is that mathematics works: that in some sense mathematics must 
contain a body of truths because these truths can be exploited to describe 
and predict events in the world. And those truths are expressed in specifi-
cally mathematical language, mentioning functions, groups and other specif-
ically mathematical entities. Mathematical explanations are successful. be-
cause (we infer) they corrcctlydescribe (the mathematical structure) of reality. 
Furthermore, this insight is strictly independent of Quincan philosophy. All it 
requires is application of the general argument for scientific realism (using in-
ference to the best explanation) to the special case of mathematics. Arguably, 
this was Quine's intention originally. But in any case, a proper understanding 
of indispensability arguments must attempt to distance itself from its Quinean 
heritage. It is this act that we attempt in this essay: indispensability without 
Quineanism. In particular, we think that indispensability arguments for real-
ism need not incorporate these dubious Quinean theses: 
A. The Quinean criterion of ontological commitment: to be is 
merely to be the value of a bound variable in a canonical (first-
order logic) statement of a theory. 
B. Mathematics is no different epistemically from the rest of sci-
ence. 
In this essay we focus entirely on the task ofliherating the indispensability 
argument from (A). The really unique aspect of our rejection of (A) is that we 
do so from a perspective that is not anti-realist, fictionalist, or nominalist, but 
from the perspective of (neo-Aristotelian) realism. A realist about a theory T is 
someone who (a) believes that T is truc, and has determinate truth-values in-
dependently of whether we are in a position to verify those truth-values, and 
(b) believes that T describes some features of reality, and that therefore the 
features that T describes 'really exist'. For example, suppose T contains arith-
metic. Then the realist believes that arithmetic has truths, that these truths 
are true anyway (independently of Ollr coming to know them), and that the 
subject-matter of arithmetic 'really exists'.s Thus far (a) and (b) describe com-
mitments that any realist shares. A neD-Aristotelian realist is someone who 
adds to commitments (a) and (b) some distinctive views about the nature of 
mathematical existence. NeD-Aristotelians hold that (c) basic mathematical 
patterns and universals are instantiated in nature (whether they can he ex-
actly perceived or not), and that in the case of huge structures that may exceed 
what's found in nature, such structures could be instantiated even if they aren't 
(see Franklin 2009). David Armstrong's position on mathematical uIliversals 
qualifies as neo-Aristotelian (Armstrong 1997; 2004: c.9). By contrast, Platonist 
50f course, it is a further matteT to specify what the suhject maHer of arithmetic is. Some would 
say it is the structure of the natural numbers as descrihed hy the Dedekind and Peano axioms. 
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realists rejcct (c) on the grounds that mathematical universals arc not perfectly 
instantiated in nature.6 
For our part, we think many [perhaps not allJ of the difficulties with the 
indispensability argument can be traced back to Quine's philosophy. His cri-
terion is anti-Aristotelian because 'value of a bound variabJe'-especially with 
the emphasis on first-order logic -is intended to be read so that the values 
can only be particulars. Nominalism and Platonism share a commitment to 
the thesis that all entities are particulars (the Platonist admitting abstract par-
ticulars, the nominalist not). Aristotelianism denies that. V\'e will clarify later 
in the paper Quine's allowing quantificntion to range over particulars but not 
properties. 
Quine's criterion of ontological commitment-'to he is to he the value 
of a variable'-is part of the standard indispensability argument. VVe think 
Quine gets the ontology of mathematics wrong in several respects, all of which 
call be traced back to his application of his criterion of ontological commit-
ment. First, Quine attempts to fit theories into the procrustean bed of first-
order logic. Thus at a single stroke he excludes an ontological commitment to 
properties. Second, his criterion of ontological commitment is geared up to 
an atomist metaphysics, emphasizing individuals rather than states of affairs 
(facts), and complexes of individuals related to one another. 
We propose an alternative to this atomist metaphysics, using what we 
might call Armstrong's new criterion of ontological commitment, 'to he is to 
be a truth-maker, or a component of a truthmaker'.7 It is then possible to run 
a new indispensability argument with a different outcome. Of course, much 
depends again on what the truthmakers are. We follow Armstrong in sup-
posing that the basic items in reality are facts as well as relations and prop-
erties. Arguably, this less atomislic and more relational approach is a better 
fit with the attractive view that mathematics is about patterns rather than ob-
jects. Whether one agrees with the resulting vievv or not. it demonstrates the 
possibility of a non-Quinean indispensability argument. 
Section 1 below explains the involvement of Quine's criterion in traditional 
indispensability arguments. Section 2 puts forward Armstrong's alternative 
proposal for ontological commitment. It explains Armstrong's complaint that 
Quine is biased against properties in his criterion of ontological commitment. 
Section 3 presents a new indispensability argument that uses Armstrong's cri-
terioll of ontological commitmellt. Section 4 concludes that the new indis-
pensability argument is hetter than the old one. 
60n th(~ issue of perfect versus ilnpcrfcct instantiation, sec Pettigrew (2009). 
IThanks to Jonathan Schaffer for the phrase. To call Armstrong's suggestion 'a criterion' is P('f-
haps to sharpen it beyond what Armstrong had in mind. However. we let it st<lnd for the sake of 
p<lrity in rliscussing Quine <lnd Armstrong on ontology. 
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2 The standard indispensability argument and its 
reliance on Quine's criterion of ontological 
commitment COC) . 
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We are concerned not so much with Quine exegesis as the indispensability ar-
gument as it has come to be knO\vI1 in wider philosophy of mathematics cir-
cles. Colyvan (2001: 11) provides a general outline of the key indispensahility 
argument: 
(l) We ought to have ontological commitment to all and Dilly the 
entities that are indispensable to ollr best scientific theories. 
(2) Mathematical entities are indispensable to OUf best scientific 
theories. 
(3) We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical 
entities. 
Ontological commitment figures twice in the argument, once in premise 
(1) and once in the conclusion (3). Ilowever, we are not told how to deter-
mine the ontological commitments of a theory, Colyvan refers to premise (1) 
as Quine's antic thesis as opposed to Quine's actual thesis of ontological com-
mitment, The idea is that (1) can serve as a general and normative premise 
about what considerations govern our ontological commitments without pro-
viding a recipe, 'a criterion'. for ontological commitment. It is clear, though, 
that the Putnam-Quine version of the argument specifically invokes Quine's 
criterion of ontological commitment (OC). This is explicit in Putnam's version 
(1971: 57): 
So far I have been developing an argument for realism roughly 
along the following lines: quantification over mathematical enti-
ties is indispensable for science, both formal and physical: there-
fore \'ve should accept silch quantification; but this commits us to 
the existence of the mathematical entities in question. This type of 
argument stems of {:ourse from Quine, who has for years stressed 
the indispensability of quantification over mathematical entities 
and the intellectual dishonesty of denying the existence of what 
one daily presupposes. 
We shall focus our discussion explicitly on this qllantijicationalform of the 
indispensahility argument. It may well be that there is a better form of the 
argument that is not so dependent on Quine's criterion of ontological com-
mitment. Be that as it may, in this form of the argument, Quine's criterion of 
ontological commitment (Oe) is used to explain the meaning of 'indispens-
ability' in the original argument. The enlities that are indispensahle are just 
those that are in the domain quantified over by the canonical statement of our 
best theory. 
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In practice, however, we still know very little about our ontological com-
mitments until we identify a specific theory and its language. Most theories 
in physics make usc of functions on the real numbers and thus incorporate 
the mathematical theory of real analysis. The very notion of measurement 
involves mapping a quantitative properly (heat, weight, mass, length, charge 
etc.) onto a real numher. For example, we measure an inchworm and learn 
that it is approximately 3.5 em. In practice, we can measure quantities by just 
rounding off decimals and reporting quantities as rational numbers. However, 
if we suppose that there are no gaps in our field of numbers and no limit to 
the exactness of measurement, we end up with something like the real num-
ber structure (as captured by the axioms of real analysis). The real number 
structure holds out the ideal of infinite precisionY 
Moreover, it looks to he the case that real analysis (or some structural sur-
rogate of it) cannot be dispensed with in (Jur physics. If this is disputed, con-
sider the fact that Held's attempt in Science wit/lOut Numbers (1980) to elim-
inate reference to the real numbers from Newtonian mechanics simply ends 
lip imposing the structure of the real numhers on a collection of spacetime 
points. Field finds this outcome acceptable as a nominalist because he urges 
that spacetime points are concrete entities, not abstract. Rul he admits he 
would not attempt to pursue physics finitistically. From a structuralist point of 
view, though, the real number structure is instantiated in Field's collection of 
spacetime points. That means that the real numbers have not really been elim-
inated from physics. Rather, we should think of the real numbers as a certain 
structure that exists physically (or could exist) rather than conceiving of them 
as the referents oflinguisHc terms that could be eliminated from the language 
of our scientific theory.9 
So it is reasonable to suppose that Quine's criterion of ontological com-
mitment applied to contemporary physics commits us to the existence of real 
numbers and functions on real numbers. 1O Thus, we can consider a more 
topic-specific version of the indispensability argument. Siewart Shapiro (2000: 
228) presE'nts one sllch version: 
(la) Real analysis refers to, and has variables range over, abstract 
objects called 'real numbers', Moreover, one who accepts the truth 
fils it just that-an ideal? Maybe. It must be admitted that realism about the reat numbers is 
harder than realism about rational numbers and natural numbers. One of the reasons for this 
is OUT measurements are never infinitety exact. for some considerations in favonr of das~ical 
realism, sec '\Jcw<;\t'ad and Franklin (2008). and 'Jewstead (20m). 
0r:or criticism ()f Field on this point, see especially Resnik (19R5). 
lOWe ignore for a moment the Teal tension betw('elltll(' view of space-time as continuous that 
we find in Newtonian mec:h<lnics and GTR with the view in Quantum Mechanics that ~pace-timc 
is qmmtised. The natural way to interpret the real numbers physically is it'i pllints in iI 'iJlilC{~-lilTle 
manifold. QM raisp" doubt" about whether we should preserve this physical interpretation of the 
reat numbers. Schrodingcr himself thought that the idea of a continuulII was exposed by QM <IS 
a myth. !l's fair to S<lY that the jury is still Ollt, hut thal Schrildingds view h<ls the most support 
among physicists. 
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of the axioms of real analysis is committed to the existence of these 
abstract entities. 
(2a) Real analysis is indispensable for physics. That is, modern 
physics can be neither formulated nor practised without state-
ments of rea] analysis. 
(3a) If real analysis is indispensable for physics, then one who ac-
cepts physics as true of material reality is thereby committed to 
the truth of real analysis. 
(4a) Physics is true, or nearly true. 
The desired conclusion is: 
(5a) Abstract entities called 'real numbers' exist. 
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Shapiro's version of the indispensability argument urges that in accepting 
physics as true, we are thereby ontologically committed to the real numbers. 
Of course, many of those who arc unmoved by indispensability arguments 
don't rcally believe in the fruth-in some heavy sense-of scientific theory in 
the first place. ·lb be sure, one need not be committed to the e..r:act truth of 
the laws of physics. The laws arc idealizations which the physical phenom-
ena approximate. Still, insofar as physical phenomena conform to the laws 
approximately, the laws are true 'ncarly enough'. 
If the truth of the scientific theory is accepted, then it becomes a straight-
forward matter to see why one would assume an ontological commitment in 
accepting the theory as true. On many substantive theories of truth, truths 
carry ontological commitments with them. for this very reason, some theo-
rists view the indispensability argument as begging the question against fic-
tionalism and instrumentalism. Savvy fictionalists (such as Leng 2005a) sim-
ply don't grant the substantive truth of scientific theories and explanations. 
This effectively blocks the inference to the reality of the items postulated by 
scientific theories. However, indispensability arguments target those who are 
already scientific realists, alld thus would accept the truth ('near enough') of 
scientific theory. The paint of the original indispensability argument was to 
show that scientific realists should not exempt mathematics from their real-
ism. 
Several other features of Shapiro·s version of the argument deserve com-
ment. Plainly, the abstractness of the entities in the conclusion is a result of 
the ahstractness having been input in the first premises-by a sleight of hand, 
Shapiro builds into premise (la) a conception of the real numbers as 'ahstract 
entities·, \vhere presumably these real numbers are to be understood as non-
spatiotemporal entities. This metaphysical conception of the real numbers is 
actually extraneous to the main argument. The vulgar conception of abstract 
objects is that they exist outside of space-time as Platonic universals. However. 
there is no need to hold a Platonist view about mathematical objects in order 
to maintain the indispensahility argument. According to our view, known as 
'neo~Aristotelian realism', we hold that universals are instantiated in nature, 
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in our actual physical world. To he SlIre, if the physical universe is not in-
finitely large in extent or in the number of particles of a certain type that it 
contains, then sume infinite structures will be universals that are merely pos-
sibly instantiated rather than concretely, actually instantiated in the physical 
universe. Even so it helps the epistemology of mathematics tremendollsly if 
we can count on there being a basic stock of mathematical universals that are 
exemplifled in the world. ror if a basic stock of mathematical universals is in-
stantiated then basic knowledge of the universals can be gained through active 
perception and imagination. lt 
It is sometimes thought to be fatal to the Aristotelian philosophy of mathe-
matics that certain mathematical forms (such as a square) are not visibly per-
fectly instantiated in nature. However, we note that there is a way around 
this problem. For exalllple, it may be that although our perceptual experi-
ence does not always present a perfect square, our perceptual experience suf-
fices to trigger in us the category specification of a perfect geometrical square. 
Thus. our perceptual experience can stimulate formation of exact mathemat-
ical concepts (Giaquinto 2007: 28: see also Newstead and Franklin 2010). Our 
perception is not fine-grained enough to allow us to discriminate between a 
perfect square and a very slightly imperfect square. The perception of a very 
slightly imperfect square is enough to induce in us the concept of a perfect 
square. This concept can then be llsed to form mathematical beliefs that are 
reliably related to perceptions of mathematical patterns. 
There is thus no reason why a proponent of indispensability arguments for 
realism must accept, without arguments, the presuppositions of Platonist re-
alism. Indeed, indispensability arguments are silent on the question of which 
variety of realism holds. 12 The metaphysical views that one extracts from in-
dispensability arguments will be largely a function of the metaphysical views 
that one injects into such arguments. One primary place for the injection of 
metaphysics is in the specification of a criterion of ontological commitment; 
another place is in the selection of a canonical form for expressing the theory. 
It is surprising, then, that Quine's criterion or ontological commitment has 
not been much criticized in the context of his indispensability argument. One 
recent exception is Azzotlni (2004) who argues in favour of 'the separation the-
sis'; we can accept scientific theories as true without being ontologieally com-
mitted to the entities in the domain of quantification of the theory. Azzouni, 
therefore, rejects Quine's criterion and uscs it to rcjeet the indispensability ar-
gument. We also reject Quine's criterion of ontological commitment We show, 
however. that we can recast the indispensability argument and perhaps inject 
new life into the argument by using a different approach to meta-ontology. 
There is the starkest possible contrast between the separation thesis and 
the truthmaker approach to ontology. Truthrnaker theorists believe that truth 
is inseparable from being to this extent: the truth of statements depends on 
11 For our position, sec Franklin (2009). 
12'ndeed. ('ven rl<1tonisls have agreed. See c'ol}'\fan (2001: 142). 
INDISPENSABILITY WITHOUT PLATONISM 89 
being (on what there is in the world). If one accepts T as true, one is ipso facto 
committed to the existence of truthmakers for T.13 
3 Armstrong's Alternative to Quine on Ontological 
Commitment 
David Armstrong has given us two promising alternatives to QUine's criterion 
of ontological commitment. First, he has suggested that our criterion for the 
reality of an object ohf'ys the Eleatic Principle (EP): everything that is real 
makes some causal difference to how the world is. [4 EP comes in handy in 
the battle against the Platonist's commitment to abstract objects, which are 
notoriously causally inert and thus (it seems, on most theories of knowledge) 
unknowable, mysteriolls, and inexplicable. However, thefe docs appear to he 
difficulty in defending EP as a criterion of reality for some mathematical ob-
jects. The curvature of space-time is used to explain the behaviour of objects 
in general relativity, but the geometrical properties of space-time are not ob-
viously causal powcrsY:; Realists want to affirm the reality of these geomet-
rical properties. Obviously in response to this kind of example it needs to be 
made clear that EP cannot simply be the slogan 'everything that exists is itself 
a causal power'. However, as we are inclined to adopt a nea-Aristotelian out-
look in philosophy of mathematics in any case, we are glad to interpret EP in 
a different way than this simple slogan suggests. Neo-Aristotelians can hold 
that if EP holds true of mathematics, it has to do so in some way that acknowl-
edges the difference betv,reen efficient causality and what we might call 'for-
mal causality'. No one finds it plausible to say that mathematical quantities 
are efficiently causally efficacious, for example, in the same way that a billiard 
ball's motion of striking another billiard ball is efficielltly causally efficacious. 
Nonetheless, perhaps mathematical quantities and patterns are causally im-
plicated in the world in some other sense: they are part of a formal causal 
explanation of the world. For example, had the constants of nature heen dif-
ferent, then objects in the world would behave differently. If G's value were 
different, then objects would not attract one another with the same gravita-
tional force that they do. Although the notion of formal causality might seem 
opaque, it is at least strong enough to support counterfactual claims. Thus, if 
x is formally causally implicated in W, then the following counterfactual holds: 
I3There are a variety of views held by truthmaker theorists on the relation between truths 
and truthrnakers. Various proposals for the relation include: supervenience, necessitation, and 
grounding. J:or a critical survey, see Schaffer (2008). J,!':'wis (200 I) advocated viewing the relation 
as supervenience, while Armstrong (2004) views the relation as one of necessitation. 
14Thc locus clussiC11S. for U' are the remarks of the Eieatic stranger in Plato's Sophist 247e. Ref-
erence to EP in contemporary discllssions originates with Oddic (19H2). In Armstrong's work. see 
Armstrong (1997: 41) and for the 'trllthm(lkf~r version', see Armstrong (2004; 7), 'every truthmaker 
should make some contribution fa the callsal order of the actual world'. 
15See Colyvan (2001; c.3) for objections to EP.. 
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had x not obtained, then some event e in W would not obtain either. Mathe-
matical quaIl t i tics are clearly formally causally operative in a counter-factually 
sustaining way. \(i For example, if the pPg had not been square, it would have 
fit in the rollnd hole. If we peer this far down the road to interpreting EP, we 
see that the disagreement between Platonists and others over EP gives way to 
a debate about hovv to understand causal-explanatory relations. 
To be sure, onc can both accept Quine's criterion of ontological commit-
ment and EP, but in practice it seems better to have EP supplant Quine's cri-
terion with EP altogether. The tendellcy of QUine's criterion is to allow into 
our ontology every individual over which ollr theories range, \vhereas the ten-
dency of EP is to restrict our ontological commitment to some smaller class of 
entities that are the real players in our theory, We cannot enter into this de-
bate fully here, but record it as yet another approach to doing ontology that 
provides a distinct realist a\tC'rnative to Quine's criterion or ontological com-
mitment. 
The second alternative to Quine's criterion of ontological commitment de-
rives from the theory of truthmaking. 17 According to the theory of truthmak-
ing, every.' truth has a truthmaker, where this truthmaker is some entity in the 
world in virtue of which the truth is true. On Armstrong's particular meta-
physics, it is indeed the case that every truth has a truth maker (truthmaker 
maximalism), and further the case that the main truth makers are facts or states 
o.faffairs. The key intuition is that truth is grounded in reality. In the absence 
of truthmakers for a given trulh, the truth would 'float free' of how the world 
is. Such 'free floating' truths strike truthmaker theorists as unacceptable. 
The truthrnaker approach to metaphysics is certainly appealing to realists, 
but doesn't suppose a particular form or realist metaphysics. 1F1 Someone with a 
basic ontology of things (rather thall racts) could allow that X was a truth maker 
for each truth of the form 'X exists', where X names some concrete particular 
(as Armstrong notes, 2004: 24). [n such a world of things, the fundamental 
truths would all have the form 'X exists'. 
Nonetheless, it is or course true that the truthmaker principlc does 
exact somc commitment to realism about the truth-values of proposi-
tions/statements. The truth maker theory docs assume a kind of bland, min-
imal realism about truthmakers. Truthmaker theory states that for every (ba-
sic) truth, there is some truthmaker in the world. As these truthmakers en-
joy a mind-independent existence, it follows that truthmakcr theory is realist 
about the existence oftruthmakers. The key point. however, is that truthmaker 
\firm an outline of how to purslle such an approach. rf'ad~rs might consult Rigelow and Parget-
ler (1990: clll. Recently. Aidan Lyon (forthnJlningl suggests that mathematical items are part of a 
'programming' explanation of how things work: Ihat is, part of the high level description that l'X-
pbins why we 'we the tran~itions between giVf~n inputs and outputs Ihat we sec. This suggestion 
may be a lTIore' contemporary way Ilfphmsing the Aristotelian claim ahollt mathematical patterns 
and quantities iH'ing formally causally explanatory of the wnrlrl. 
17 Sec Armstrong (2004) for a basic exposition. 
IBWe haW' beell hclpC'd hy reading Cameron (2()OFl). 
INDISPENSABILITY WITHOUT PLATONISM 91 
theory does not identify the truth makers for us. There is no automatic way 
to move from a statement to identification of the truthmaker for that state-
ment. In particular, no amount of analysis of the logical form of a statemcnt-
without doing some seriolls metaphysics-is going to tell us what the truth-
makers are. Russell's logical atomism made this mistake, and Armstrong (2001: 
23) does not repeat it. 
The Iruthmaker method suggests, then, a very general way of do-. 
ing metaphysics: 
'To postulate certain truthmakers for certain truths is to admit 
those truthmakers into one's ontology. The complete range of 
truthmakers admitted constitutes a metaphysics ... ' 
Armstrong emphasizes that the hunt for truthrnakers is as hard an enterprise 
as doing metaphysics itself or science. Our ontological commitments will de-
pend on our having identified a true theory of nature. Given a disdain for 
purely armchair science and metaphysics, this theory of nature will be deter-
mined a posteriori. For example, if it should turn out that everything is made 
out of sub-atomic particles such as quarks and gluons, then perhaps the tfllth-
makers for certain statements abollt the physic(li world such as 'There's a table' 
will be complex facts about how sub-atomic particles arc arranged in a certain 
space. That means to a certain extent that the contemporary metaphysician 
must wait on science. According to Armstrong's a posteriori realism, science 
will discover and identify the basic universals.l~J At best. the metaphysician 
can hazard a guess about the general structure of the truth makers that will 
satisfy our best scientific theories. 
To remain faithful to his a posteriori realism, Armstrong warns that truth-
maker theory is only 'a promising way to regiment metaphysics ... not a royal 
road' (Armstrong 2004: 22). Nonetheless, it is tempting to harden his theory 
into a criterion for ontological commitment. The slogan for ontological com-
mitment on Armstrong's theory is therefore 'to be is to be a truthrnaker (or part 
of one) for a true theory,.2o We have horrowed this slogan frolll Schaffer (2009) 
and amended it by adding 'or part of one'. 
How will our ontological commitments differ from those of a Quinean, 
supposing that both followers of Armstrong and Quine are assessing the same 
scientific theory? Tn particular, how will our mathematical ontology differ? 
We contend that following Armstrong's 'truthmaker' approach will result in a 
richer mathematical ontology that includes properties, relations, and facts. 
Consider the statements: 
1~ l'he term 'a posteriori realism' is used by Mumford (2007) to describe Armstrong's position. 
70 Adapted from Schaffer (2009). We would prefer 'to be is to he the value of a trlHhmaker or 
olle of its compo/wilts thPreof'. Consider the statement This square is red'. The propcrty of be-
ing red is one of the components of the fael (this square·s being red) that makes the statement 
truc. 011 Armstrong's view, til(' main metaphysical commitment is to the fact or state of affairs of 
this- sql/(lrp:~·IJPi/lg·rPd. Ilowever, the primacy of f<-leis doesn't undermine the real existence of its 
component,;;. this sqlwrpand the prnpf'rtv of [,pillg rpd (which is partly instantiated in thi~ square)). 
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(1) Fa 
(2) 3x (Fx) 
Quine thinks (2) makes plain the ontological commitment of the simple state-
ment (1). If one accepts 'fa' as true, then one's ontological commitment 
amounts to this: there is something that is F. One's ontological commitment 
is to some particular with some property called 'F'-but not to some property 
F instantiated in some particular a: one need not view T' as naming a univer-
sal properly, and one need not adopt a realist view of properties. If one likes 
une can read (2) in a functionalist manner as saying that there is something 
that plays the role of being E If one were further committed to the reality of 
roles (on the grounds of the theory's heing 'heavily' true in some realist way), 
then fe-iterating the Quinean procedure would suggest olle also accept 
(3) 3x 3F (Fx) 
In (3) the commitment to the existence of an object and a property is made 
explicit. But Quineans do not think that (I) and (2) imply (3), because one 
might accept (1) or (2) as true, without being committed to the separate 'exis-
tence' (as asserted by the existential predicate) of E This raises the spectre that 
one might accept the truth of a statement' a is F' while being deflationary in 
metaphysical terms about what this truth requires. fiction is one area where 
we are lIsed to this phenomenon. For example, 'Santa Claus has a beard' is 
true at least in the context of the Santa Claus story, but there is no bearded 
individual in the world that makes this statement true. However, in lieu of 
an argument for treating the statements of our scientific theories as fiction, 
the Quinean needs good reasons to hlock the move from (2) to (3). It seems 
that only a bias against second-order logic blocks the move. The bias against 
second-order logic, though, is mainly grounded in a distrust of properties as 
obscure entities Jacking clear-cut individuation criteria. 
Aristotelian realists sllch as Armstrong and his defenders argue that one 
needs the property 1"; the particular a, and also the fact of a~\j being p, to ex-
ist ill order to make (1) true. According to (1), there is some particular that is 
E This somethillg cannot be a hare particular; it must have properties too. If 
'Fa' is true. then there is something that has the property called 'F'. In accept-
ing (1) one is committed to there being something (called' a') possessing some 
property (called 'F')21 
Armstrong for his part has long viewed Quine as guilty of 'ostrich nomi-
nalism': Quine thinks he can accept the truth of a statements such as 'a is F' 
('That house is red') and 'b is f' (That sunset is red') but not incur any on-
tological commitment to the property of being r (red) (Armstrong 1978: 16). 
21 But why stop here? The particular a and tlIP property FtnllSI be relatE'd somehow. since 'a is 
F' asserts that a has F'ncss, not just the existCllcP of a and F unrelated. Armstrong proposes we 
take the state of affairs (or farll of a:~ bping F as the lrulhtnakcr for' t1 is P'. One may also point out 
th,1t one i~ rnmmitll'd 10 the components of the fact of (1\ l!ping r which are the individual (I and 
the pmpertv F. since facts sllp('rvpne 011 their C'ompOIH'nts. 
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Quine refrains from analysing '0 is F' in such a way that it implies that there is 
a property of F-ness. However, in doing so Quine is left without the resources 
to explain in vI/hat respect individuals a and b resemble each other (as regards 
colour). The ,mcicnt 'onc over many' argument posits universals (shared prop-
erties) as an answer to such puzzles. There are thus legitimate arguments for 
universals that go unanswered hy Quine (e.g. Armstrong 1978: c.6; Armstrong 
1997: c.3.J. It will not do simply to dismiss the reality of universals (properties) 
by logical fiat. 
As one might expect. Quine's analysis of the truth 'a is F' offers a desert 
landscape: an ontological commitlllent to the lone individual called 'a' that 
might satisfy the open sentence '. is F'. Quine lacks the knowledge of Aus-
tralians that deserts are not barren, but teeming with life. Armstrong's Aus-
tralian picture of the matter is a dense, fertile landscape. The metaphysics 
required for the truth of' a is F' include an object a, its property F, and the fact 
that a is F 
4 The Indispensability Argument Revised 
How now does the indispensability argument look if we run it using Arm-
strong's approach to ontological commitment? As we saw in the previous sec-
tion, Armstrong's approach contains several components: 
(a) Truthmakcr theory (vvhich includes at a minimum the claim 
that every truth has a truthrnaker together with some account of 
the truth-making relation). 
(b) Armstrong's ovm particular metaphysics, wllich identifies facts 
(states of affairs) as the main truthmakers, allowing for compo-
nents of those facts (properties, relations, objects) as real exis-
tents. 
We are going to apply (a) and a rather loose interpretation of (b) to the indis-
pensahility argument we considered earlier. In doing so-as is typical of the 
approach to metaphysics by hunting down truthrnakers-we have to identify 
the particular truthmakcrs for a set of truths by examining those truths them-
selves and the practice in which they are found. 
The old indispensahility argument (la-Sa) claims that the truths of real 
analysis are indispensable to physics. We think the argument is correct in find-
ing real analysis to be indispensable for physics. So, assuming that real analysis 
is indispensable to physics, we need to identify the truthmakers of real analy-
sis. It is here that we go beyond truth maker theory to offer a particular meta-
physical claim about the nature of mathematical truthmakers. Our specula-
tion is in keeping with Armstrong's metaphysics, although it is not specifically 
his view. Our view is that one of the main truthmakcrs for real analysis is the 
standard real number structure as found in any real number continuum. It is 
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this structure which is described by the axioms of real analysis. These axioms 
include claims such as: 
(Btw) Between any two real numbers x and y, there is another real 
number z. 
(UB) Any set of real numbers with an IIpper bound has a least up-
per bound. 
(Archimedean Property) for any positive numbers x and y where. 
x<y, there is some natural number 11 such that nx> y. 
In addition to the continuum, real analysis also makes claims about func-
tions and their properties such as differentiability, continuily, and integrabil-
ity. So perhaps these properties should be taken as components of the facts 
that are the truth makers for classical real analysis. 
How does the indispensability argument look if we run it using Arm-
strong's criterion of ontological commitment? Remember that since Arm-
strong's 'truth maker' criterion of ontological commitment is formal, we will 
need to supplement it with our preferred identification of the truthmakers of 
analysis. Here's how the revised argument looks: 
(1) The statements of real analysis concern truths about the real 
number continuum, both its subsets (sequences of the real num-
bers), the properties of those subsets (e.g. convergence) and all 
the functions that can be defined on subsets of the real number 
eontinuulIl, along with the properties of those functions (e.g. dif~ 
ferentiability, smoothness etc.). 
(2) The truthmakers for statements in real analysis include se-
quences of real numhrrs and functions with the relevant proper~ 
ties. One who accepts the truths of the axioms of real analysis is 
committed to the existence of these mathematical entities. (Note 
that as usual reference to the real numbers is not to abstract en-
tities called 'the real numbers' hut to a structure, the real number 
continuum, that could be realised in space.) 
The rest of the argument is unchanged: 
(3) Real analysis is ill dispensable for physics. That is, modern 
physics can be neither formulated nor practised without state-
ments of real analysis. 
(4) If real analysis is indispensable for physics, then one who ac-
cepts physics as true of material reality is thereby committed to 
the truth of real analysis. 
(5) Physics is true, or nearly true. 
The immediate conclusion of the argument is that we are committed to the 
existence of the truthmakers of real analysis. These truthrnakers have been 
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identified in step (2) of the argument as the sequences and functions of real 
numbers with the properties studied in real analysis (such as convergence. dif-
ferentiahility etc.). So the final conclusion is: 
(6) We are committed to the truthmakers of real analysis. These in-
clude (perhaps) the real number structure, real valued functions, 
and the properties ofreal numbers and real-valued functions. 
We stress that the conclusion is contingent on otlr having the correct identi-
fication of the truth makers of real analysis. Moreover. identification of such 
truth makers is a matter for those thinking about the metaphysics of mathe-
matics. In doing so, one should bear in mind how the mathematics is being 
applied. However, we cannot expect an indispensability argument to tell us 
straight out what those truthmakers are. 
5 One Problem with the New Indispensability 
Argument 
We need to deal vvith problems that arise for our version of the indispensabil~ 
ity argument, specifically from the fact that the mathematical theory under 
scrutiny is real analysis. While no one doubts that the ontology of classical 
real analysis includes an uncountably infinite real~number continuum. there 
are legitimate questions about the relation of the mathematical continuum to 
the structure of spare~time. Whether space-time has a continuum-structure 
or a grainy struClure is an empirical question. Thus far the evidence is equivo-
cal, but leans towards suggesting the structure of space-time is grainy and not 
continuous (\IVolfram 2002). 
There are two possible solutions. Aristotle's own solution was to hold that 
the points of a continuurn do not actually exist all at oncc. Hather, a point 
comes into being when we undertake an activity, such as dividing a line. Prior 
to such activity on the part of the mathematician, the point exists only po-
tentially as the boundary of a line segment. The upshot of this view is that 
the truth maker for many statements of real analysis could be a merely possi-
ble mathematical continuum. There is no need to be wedded to the view that 
there is a (physical) continuum in space-time. 
Another possible solution is to revise our notion of which part of math-
ematics is indispensable for physics. Maybe real analysis is not indispens-
able, but some weaker form of real analysis is. Perhaps an exact mathemat-
ical description of the physical universe does not involve real analysis with 
its commitment to infinite divisibility. Instead the appropriate mathematics 
would be discrete analysis in which, for example, limits as ~x tends to 0 are 
replaced by ersatz limits as ~x tends to h (the size of an atom of space or 
time). Discrete analysis is mathematically legitimate, however, cumbersome 
(Zcilbcrger 20(4). The main philosophical point, however, is that its ontolog-
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ical commitments are to the same kind of entities as real analysis: (discrete) 
functions which possess properties such as ersatz convergence and differen-
tiability_ The indispensability argument goes through with these entities and 
properties rather than the conventional ones. A kind of mathematical realism 
is still vindicated. 
6 Conclusion 
It is clear that funning the indispensability argument with Armstrong's total 
approach to ontology results in a qualitatively richer ontology than the one 
offered by Quine. The mathematics that proves indispensable includes not 
just sets. but mathematical properties and facts about these properties and re-
lations. But Quine's mathematical ontology is quantitatilJely richer: it allows 
unlimited numbers of classes. As Aristotelian realists, we would prefer to posit 
no more structures than we absolutely need to do the applied science: the rest 
might he uninstantiated structures of the sort posited by Platonism. We still 
think it's a gain to have one's basic structures be natural structures, however. 
In this way knowledge of such structures hecomes less mysterious than knowl-
edge of Platonic forms. 
Our modest aim has been to delineate a possible position in logical space: 
realism ahout mathematics without Platonism, but motivated (in part) by 
indispensability considerations. We have shown that indispensability argu-
ments can be run free of Quinean ontological baggage, such as Quine's crite-
rion of ontological commitment. In its place we have suggested that the truth-
maker approach to ontology might be preferable. We have tried to explain 
what sllch a view might look like, although in completing this task we needed 
to corne up with our own preferred metaphysics of mathematics: Aristotelian 
realism (Franklin 2009). 
We now pause to consider the peculiarity of our procedure. We have in-
voked truthmaker theory in our indispensahility argument. Butlhe indispens-
ability argument is supposed to he an argument for realism on independent 
groundS-it shouldn't assume realism about mathematics. Doesn't insisting 
that the truths of mathematics have truthmakers assume realism about math-
ematics? We answer that it does assume semantic value realism (the truths 
of mathematics-guess what?~-have truth-values) but it does not assume a 
particular form of metaphysical realism. Truthmakcr theory is itself agnostic 
about the identity of truthmakers for a particular theory, such as real analysis 
in mathematics. We have Ollr favourite view of the existence of these truth-
makers as Aristotelian realists. But our Aristotelian realism is a commitment 
beyond truth maker theory, and not one that we expect everyone to share. 
Given our modest aim of establishing the viahility of an alternative to Quine's 
Platonist indispensability argument, it would still be consistent with the letter 
of our position if all indispensability arguments were to be shown to reach the 
conclusion of realism by assuming realism at the outset. We don't think this 
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would be a desirable outcome, but it is a possibility. Valid arguments can be 
question-begging, of course. To avoid begging the question we would want 
to have reasons independent of realism about mathematics for thinking that 
truthmaking was a good approach to determining the ontology of science. 
We think that indispensability arguments provide compelling reasons to 
be realist, hut not to be Platonist. The standard Quine-Putnam version of the 
argument relics on Quine's qU31ltificational criterion of ontological commit-
ment. It also imports a specifically Platonist version of realism in Its suggestion 
that numbers and sets are 'abstract objects' (conceived of as existing outside 
of space and time). These metaphysical biases are not essential to the indis-
pensabilityargument. 
We suggest that another version of indispensability is preferable. We have 
suggested that \'\'f' replace Quine's criterion with Armstrong's truthmaker cri-
terion: 'to be is to be a truth maker. or part of one, for a true theory', We then 
tried to apply Armstrong's truthmaker approach to determine the ontologi-
cal commitments of mathematical theories taking the theory of real analysis 
as our case study. We suggested that application of truthmakcr suggests a 
mathematical ontology in which the fundamental items of mathematics are 
not lone objects, but patterns, properties, functions, facts, and relations. Such 
a qualitatively multifarious ontology--an Armstrongian hush, not a Quinean 
desert-might have advantages \'\'hen it comes to maintaining a naturalistic 
epistemology. 
